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Abstract    
 
Discussions of academic entrepreneurship often focus on efforts to commer-
cialize inventions appropriated within the intellectual property (IP) system. How-
ever, studies in the U.S. have shown that a substantial amount of entrepreneurship 
happens outside of the formal IP system.  
In the UK each university sets its own rules on ownership of IP. In a few Euro-
pean countries, like Sweden, an inventor ownership model is dominating. There is 
a lack of studies of European academic entrepreneurship outside of the formal IP 
system; and accordingly there have been few possibilities to analyze the effects of 
different institutional set ups.  
To help fill this gap, this chapter analyses how different institutional settings 
affect academic entrepreneurship in Europe. By analyzing both patents and spin-
offs (from Oxford University, UK and Chalmers University, Sweden) we will 
shed light on two processes for commercialization of university research. We em-
pirically investigate university technology transfer at two different universities in 
two countries with a different inventor ownership regulation.  
 
1. Introduction 
It has been argued that Europe’s research and industrial base has a compara-
tively limited capacity to convert scientific breakthroughs and technological 
achievements into commercial successes (e.g. the EU White Paper 1993). The 
perception of a strong European science base which is not translated into econom-
ic growth is often labelled the “European Paradox” (EU 1995). Over time, the fo-
cus has turned to the commercialization of publicly financed R&D. Even though 
some reports (Arundel and Bordoy, 2008; Bergman, 2010) have pointed to posi-
tive trends in, for example, efforts to encourage the creation of university spin-
offs, there is a strong belief that the EU under-performs in the commercialization 
of publicly funded science. 
 
The discussion of academic entrepreneurship often concentrates on faculty ef-
forts to commercialize inventions appropriated within the intellectual property (IP) 
system organized by university administrators, e.g. Technology Transfer Office 
(TTOs). There has also been an assumption that academic entrepreneurial activi-
ties are reflected through the disclosure of patents via TTOs. However, studies in 
3 
the U.S. have shown that a substantial amount of academic entrepreneurship hap-
pens outside of the formal IP system (Fini, Lacetera and Shane, 2010; Markman et 
al, 2008). Possibly then, similar processes may exist also in Europe. This has clear 
implications for normative assumptions about the seamless linear processes of re-
search to commercialization within the context of now worldwide societal objec-
tives on capitalizing on knowledge (see Etkzowitz and Klofsten 2005).  
 
The specifics of the political context are, however, crucial. For example, while 
in the UK, since the mid-1980s, each university has been able to set its own rules 
on ownership of IP, in a few other European countries, like Sweden and Italy, an 
inventor ownership model is dominating. There is a lack of studies of European 
academic entrepreneurship that happens outside of the formal IP system; and ac-
cordingly there have been few possibilities to analyze the effects of different insti-
tutional set ups.  
 
To fill this gap, this chapter asks the question, how do different institutional 
settings affect the commercialization/exploitation of university research in Eu-
rope? In order to answer the question, we empirically investigate university tech-
nology transfer at two universities in two countries with a different inventor own-
ership regulation. The two cases are Oxford University in the UK and Chalmers 
University in Sweden. The Oxford case will be used to illustrate the university 
ownership model, while the Chalmers case represents the inventor ownership 
model. The two cases are selected because both universities have well-established 
commercialization systems. Both universities are also creating a high number of 
university spin-off companies. In the UK, only Cambridge University has created 
a higher number of spin-offs than Oxford. In Sweden, however, Chalmers Univer-
sity is only ranked eighth in university spin-off creation. The largest Swedish uni-
versities create even more university spin-offs. Thus, in relation to its size 
Chalmers is performing like an average Swedish university.  
 
Our empirical data allow us to compare the formation and performance of aca-
demic spin-offs at the two universities. We investigate and analyze how Oxford 
academics involved in spin-off companies disclose or exploit patents inside or 
outside the formal university IP system. In the Chalmers case we have identified a 
high number of spin-offs, both by faculty leaving the university and by faculty 
keeping their university positions. Our comparisons will add further insights of the 
impact of different intellectual property ownership by highlighting these issues in 
the European context. By analyzing both patents and university spin-offs we are 
able to shed light on two processes through which the commercialization of uni-
versity research occurs. 
 
The chapter begins with explanations of the university spin-off phenomena. It 
focuses particularly on institutional conditions which influence the formation of 
university spin-offs. Next the methodology and results are presented. The results 
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provide new insights and perspectives on technology transfer processes through 
university spin-off firms. In the last section, some conclusions are drawn and some 
limitations and recommendations for further research are discussed. 
 
2. University spin-offs and technology transfer  
The effort to create a knowledge-based economy has significantly emphasized 
the role of universities in commercializing new innovations including scientific 
and technological discoveries from the research laboratories (O’Shea et al., 2004). 
In addition, the importance of technology and knowledge transfer from university 
to industry including the necessity to build closer association between sci-
ence/technology and its application and exploitation have driven the development 
of numerous entrepreneurial initiatives inside universities (Allen, 1995). The term, 
“the entrepreneurial university” (Etzkowitz 1983), was an early recognition of 
universities acting entrepreneurial, including a growing number of academic sci-
entists in the US who were forming their own companies. 
 
Numerous explanations of factors contributing to the formation of university 
spin-offs as well as other forms of commercialization through such as patents and 
licenses have followed. Four are highlighted. Firstly, legislative initiatives are 
widely regarded as contributing to an acceleration of the formation of spin-off 
ventures. For example in the UK, from 1985, universities were given autonomy to 
arrange their own rules and policies on IP ownership (Lawton Smith and Ho, 
2006). Secondly, universities with cultures that embrace entrepreneurial activity 
not only have better rates of commercialization through patenting but also have 
high numbers of academic spin-offs than those which do not (O’Shea et al., 2004). 
Earlier Roberts (1991) proposed that a university’s social norms and expectations 
are key factors in encouraging commercial activity. Thirdly, reputations including 
research prominence of universities are strongly linked to the rate of spin-off crea-
tion (Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003). Fourth, the regional knowledge infrastructure 
plays a vital role in supporting university spin-offs activity. Saxenian (1994), for 
example, illustrated that the formation of university spin-offs are more likely to 
happen in high-technology clusters because of easy access to local expertise, net-
works and knowledge. However, other evidence suggests that even when these are 
in place, they are not necessarily used by the spin-off firms (see for example Har-
rison and Leitch 2010). 
 
The potential monetary, political and social pay-offs from such activities have 
motivated policy makers and university administrators to support these entrepre-
neurial activities. Of particular importance is the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, which 
granted US universities ownership rights of academic intellectual property. In the 
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UK, the government has provided financial and political incentive structures to 
support R&D based entrepreneurial activity. By the year 2000, the number of 
spinoffs began to rise substantially in the UK. This was associated with an in-
crease in the number of personnel working on technology transfer at UK’s univer-
sities (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006). In 2007/08, spin off companies from higher 
education institutions (HEIs) employed almost 4,500 people, had a turnover of 
more than £73 million and had acquired over £52 million in external investments 
(BIS 2009).  
 
While many European nations have now abandoned the “Professor’s privilege” 
(Geuna and Rossi, 2011), some US researchers, for example Kenney and Patton 
(2009), have criticized the university-ownership model, and suggest instead an 
“Alternative model” with inventor ownership. Indeed, comparing the inventor 
ownership model with the university ownership model, they conclude that this:  
“...showed that the inventor ownership regime strikingly dominates the better funded, 
more highly rated, and much larger university ownership universities.” (Kenney and 
Patton 2011, p. 1109) 
 
The argument that inventor ownership has a positive effect on entrepreneurship 
is part of a growing literature that critically addresses institutional ownership. It is 
not necessarily the case that a Bayh-Dole-type institutional change will have a 
positive effect on technology transfer and economic growth. Kenney and Patton 
(2011) provided three examples where adopting a Bayh-Dole-type model has not 
been successful: Cambridge, UK (Breznitz, 2011), Japan (Carraz, 2008; Takahasi 
and Carraz, 2009) and Denmark (Valentin and Jensen, 2007). Of these, the Uni-
versity of Cambridge is the clearest case for showing that an inventor ownership 
model can be successful for transferring technology and encouraging entrepre-
neurship (Breznitz, 2011). Abandoning this model, to mimic the US Bayh-Dole 
model, in this case did not lead to increased technology transfer or entrepreneur-
ship. Instead, there are indications that entrepreneurship, particularly in biotech-
nology declined.  
 
In addition, most often, the academic entrepreneurial activities revealed by of-
ficial statistics agencies are those that arguably take place inside the formal IP sys-
tem such as industrial collaborations or consulting (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; 
Mansfield, 1995, 1998). The process of academic entrepreneurship is most often 
envisioned as a practice that begins with a disclosure of a new invention to a TTO, 
which then turns into a patented discovery that is either licensed out to companies 
or exploited to create a new company (Fini et al, 2010). This process has received 
attention from scholars, including studies of invention disclosure (Thursby and 
Thursby, 2005), patenting (Henderson et al., 1998; Mowery et al., 2002; Mowery 
and Ziedonis, 2002; Sampat et al., 2003), licensing (Jensen and Thursby, 2001; 
Jensen et al., 2003), and the exploitation of university-assigned IP to form new 
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companies (Markman et al., 2004; Mustar et al., 2006; Nerkar and Shane, 2003, 
Shane 2004). The multi-dimensional characteristics of university–industry linkag-
es (Agrawal 2001; Bonaccorsi and Piccaluga 1994), which can also be considered 
as entrepreneurial activity, include a range of avenues (Cohen et al. 2002; D’Este 
and Patel 2007; Faulkner 1994) or ‘mechanisms’ (Meyer-Krahmer and Schmoch 
1998) in which knowledge and resources are exchanged and co-created between 
universities and industry without any occurrence of IP disclosure through formal 
systems. 
 
There has been a distinct move away from the Professor’s privilege in Europe 
towards various systems of institutional ownership in the belief that the commer-
cialization of research results will be facilitated (EU, 2007, 2008, 2009; Geuna 
and Rossi, 2011). Sweden is now one of few European countries who have not 
abandoned the Professor’s Privilege. This is so despite several national govern-
ment investigations and repeated arguments by e.g. the OECD that Sweden should 
change this institutional setting. In a recent paper, Jacobsson, Lindholm Dahl-
strand and Elg (2013) discussed this “dominant belief” and the commercialization 
of academic research in Sweden. They found strong indications that Sweden was 
performing quite well, both in terms of the number of university spin-offs created 
and the amounts of patenting originating in Swedish Universities. They argue that 
in the Swedish case, where about 80 per cent of the academic patents were found 
to be assigned to industry, abandoning the Professor’s privilege for a University 
ownership model could well have negative effects since it would risk disrupting 
the strong knowledge sharing networks. As Geuna and Rossi (2011, p. 1075) ar-
gue: 
“In countries where university enforcement of IPR has traditionally been weak...because 
of the professor’s privilege...academic inventors have...patented their inventions 
individually or assigned IPR ownership to collaborating firms. In these contexts, 
regulations ...enforcing university ownership may increase university-owned patents at the 
expense of university-invented patents. Care must be taken...not to disrupt pre-existing 
functioning knowledge transfer relationships between academic inventors and firms.” 
 
Jacobsson et al. (2013) concluded that there is strong evidence that a) substan-
tial academic patenting activity takes place in Sweden, although ‘invisible’ with-
out detailed scrutiny of patent data bases, and b) the IPR rests within the business 
community to a greater extent than in other countries – and that the transfer mech-
anism obviously works. They base this conclusion on a few earlier studies of aca-
demic patenting, e.g. Lissoni et al. (2009) which set out to specify this magnitude 
in several countries, including Sweden. They capture patents held by individual 
researchers as well as by firms collaborating with an academic researcher who is 
the inventor, but not the owner. The share of academic patents, defined in that 
way, of total patents was found to be at the same level in Sweden as in the U.S. (6 
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per cent) and higher than that of France and Italy1. The significance of this rela-
tively high figure is magnified by the extensive patenting activity for Sweden as a 
whole. Hence, Swedish academics account for a high share of an internationally 
very high number of patent applications.  
 
As mentioned, most of these Swedish patents are, however, not owned by the 
academics but by firms collaborating with Universities. Geuna and Rossi (2011, 
Table 5) point to a very high Swedish share of business ownership (81%), higher 
than other European countries. Moreover, these European shares are much higher 
than that of the USA. In the Swedish case, the top companies owning academic 
patents include large multinational companies which interact to a great extent with 
universities and obviously very often come out of that collaboration with the IPR.  
 
In addition to patenting and university-industry networking, Jacobsson et al. 
(2013) also analyzed different categories of university spin-offs. In earlier studies 
there is a great variety in definitions and measurement of university spin-offs. One 
main issue has to do with whether it is research/technology that is spun-off or if it 
is the individual researcher who leaves his/her employment to set up a new firm. 
In their definition of university spin-offs, Jacobsson et al (2013) included both di-
rect university spin-offs and two categories of firms that involve spinning off 
knowledge from University research, see Figure 1. Direct university-spin-offs are 
established by university researchers themselves, both by researchers leaving the 
university and those staying and creating a side-line firm.   
  
Fig. 1 Categories of spin-offs founded on Swedish university research. (Source Jacobsson, 
Lindholm Dahlstrand and Elg 2013)  
                                                          
1 The US share of 6 per cent is calculated by Lissoni et al., (2009), based on Thursby et al., 
(2009). For Sweden, Ejermo (2011) arrives at a figure of 4-5 per cent, but using the same method 




Among the indirect spin-offs, Jacobsson et al (2013) include firms established 
by previously employed university researchers (alumni) but not until the founder 
has worked an additional time in industry. In addition are firms founded by an 
“external entrepreneur” who is not the university researcher. In these firms, the 
university researcher stays with the university and keeps his/her university em-
ployment. Taken jointly, they estimated that about 875 new firms were started 
every year based on university research in Sweden.  
 
Unfortunately, Jacobsson et al. found no available international data that were 
directly comparable with the Swedish. One reason for this is that in countries with 
a university ownership model, it is normally the IP and the disclosures that are 
measured, for example by university TTOs and associations like AUTM in the 
US. This means that in available spin-off data, information is not usually given 
about whether the university researchers have kept their university employment or 
not. Even so, they presented a rough comparison with UK and US spin-off data. 
The UK data were drawn from HE-BCI survey2 and US data by AUTM3. Their 
finding was that the figures for both UK and US were of the same magnitude as 
                                                          
2 Funding of British HEIs (Higher Education Institutes) partly depends on spin-off creation, and, 
thus, the data reporting is not likely to be an underestimation. See 
http://www.hefce.ac.uk/econsoc/buscom/hebci/ This data is collected annually from British HEIs 
since 2003. 
3 The AUTM data only report spin-offs based on disclosures registered at participating universi-
ties. It should be noted that the AUTM studies only include data from less than 200 US Universi-
ties. These universities are, however, the most research intensive ones. AUTM data for 2004 to 
2010 is available at http://www.autm.net/home.htm 
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the direct university spin-offs in Sweden (only quadrant IV in Figure 1). The 
AUTM reports some 400 to 650 university spin-offs each year, while the British 
HE-BCI survey reports between 150 and almost 300, i.e. within the range of the 
figures for Sweden. 
 
Moreover, since the US and the UK data only report spin-offs based on disclo-
sures registered at participating universities, that is, within the IP system, this 
would suggest that the figures seriously underestimate the total spin-off frequency 
(Åstebro et al, 2012). This problem was discussed by Fini et al. (2010) who found 
that only 35 percent of new firms started by university researchers in the US were 
based on patented inventions within the IP system. Correcting for this would mean 
that the US figure should be increased to about 1 600 spin-offs per year.  
To inform and provide faculties, universities and policy makers with more ac-
curate picture on academic entrepreneurial activities and parameter than the only 
mechanism of patents disclosure via formal IP channel is one important aim with 
this chapter. Here we ask how different institutional settings affect academic en-




This chapter uses two case studies – Oxford University in the UK and 
Chalmers University in Sweden – to analyze and compare technology transfer and 
university entrepreneurship in two different institutional contexts.  
 
The Oxford Case 
The University of Oxford is one of the world’s top universities. Oxford offers 
more than 320 different graduate degree programmes and has over 9,800 graduate 
students from more than 140 countries and territories, over 5,500 graduate re-
search students and nearly 12,000 undergraduates. Oxford's research activity in-
volves more than 70 departments with over 10 000 employees, including 1,600 
academic staff and 3,000 research staff. In 2011-12, total University income was 
£1,016.1 million, out of which about half was research. External research grants 
and contracts is the University’s largest source of income. In 2011-12, 40% (£409 
million) of income came from external research sponsors. 
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In a world university rankings published by Times Higher Education in 
2012/13, Oxford University is ranked 2nd. Its place in this ranking is owing to 
unique qualities, i.e., high concentration of “world-class scientists”, the world’s 
second best university in medical and the fifth best university in biological science 
disciplines (QS World University Ranking, 2012), as well as a number of interdis-
ciplinary research centers, which some have links with international academic and 
industrial partners (Lawton Smith and Ho, 2006).  
 
Oxford University has an elite and very well-established commercialization 
system; it also creates three times as many spin-offs as UK universities on aver-
age. Only Cambridge University has created more spin-offs than Oxford has. The 
key mechanism for creating university spin-offs is through Isis Innovation, the 
university’s technology transfer company, established in 1988. Commercialization 
activities, however, only started to take off and expand in 1997 following the ap-
pointment of a successful entrepreneur and business angel as CEO (Lawton Smith 
and Ho, 2006). Since then, Isis Innovation has been in charge of generating spin-
off firms based on academic research produced within and owned by the Universi-
ty. So far it has supported the formation of more than 75 companies. It has created 
a new spin-off company every two months on average (Isis Innovation, 2013). 
Since 2000, external investment of over £266 million has been raised by spin-off 
companies, and 5 Oxford spin-off firms have been listed on London’s AIM mar-
ket. Besides, in 2012, Isis Innovation filed 100 patent applications on behalf of the 
University; it also manages over 470 patent application families as well as 700 li-
cense agreements (Isis Innovation, 2013). It is claimed that licensees and commer-
cial partners are solicited from both national and international technology and 
business sectors. In the Oxford case we use a sample of university spin-offs which 
is drawn from the existing database of 75 companies spun out from the University 
of Oxford and published on the Isis Innovation website.  
 
In the data collection process, first we use the ICC Directory of UK Companies 
provided by Lexis Nexis and Companies House (lexisnexis.com/uk/nexis/search 
and companieshouse.gov.uk) which contained detailed profiles of the companies 
including the company’s registered address, date of incorporation, board of direc-
tors, any subsidiaries which the company may own, key facts about the compa-
nies, and financial data. In this study, we identified and listed names of directors 
of all 75 Oxford spin-off companies. Second, we cross-checked all director names 
with the University of Oxford’s contact search database to find out who is an aca-
demic and in which departments or colleges he/she is currently working. Howev-
er, the database does not provide the period(s) of employment with the University 
of Oxford. Third, to investigate the patents’ profile of the Oxford university aca-
demics, patent searches were done via the Espacenet of the European Patent Of-
fice. ESP@CENET on the European Patent Office website includes records of the 
patents filed by companies which can be accessed and searched by a range of cri-
teria such as applicant name, inventor name, and so on. We conducted the search 
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by inputting the name of an academic as an “inventor” and put in different appli-
cants beginning with (i) “name of academic”, (ii) “Isis Innovation”, and (iii) 
“company name”. This patents search process is repeated for all academics in the 
database.   
 
We recorded the following details: i) number of patents, ii) publication date 
(the date when the patent is filed) iii) applicants or assignees, iv) European classi-
fication number. In addition, we noted down whether the patents were assigned to 
Isis Innovation or the University of Oxford, or, otherwise, were filed under other 
names. This is used to determine if the patents filed stay within the University IP 
system or have bypass potential. We also report on the size of university spin-offs 
(employees and turnover) within the university system and with a potential by-
pass. 
 
The Chalmers case 
Chalmers University of Technology, in Gothenburg, Sweden, is one of the old-
est and largest institutes of technology in Sweden. It offers Master of Science de-
grees, Bachelor degrees and doctoral degrees. Research is carried out in the main 
engineering sciences as well as in technology-related mathematical and natural 
sciences. Some 2 300 employees work at Chalmers’ 17 departments. Of these 
some 1600 are teachers and researchers. The turnover is around £ 0.25 billion a 
year (2011); two-thirds of this sum relates to research. Thus, Chalmers amount of 
research is around a third of Oxford’s (i.e. 30% of research income, 34% of re-
search staff).  
 
Since 2000 Chalmers has a vice-president who is responsible for external rela-
tions. A strategic decision is that the processes of knowledge transfer and com-
mercialization should be fully integrated with Chalmers research and education 
activities. Approximately 60 full-time equivalents work with knowledge transfer 
and commercialization at Chalmers. In addition several hundreds of persons from 
business work pro-bone as advisors, board members, industrial faculty, etc., there-
by supporting Chalmers’ knowledge transfers and commercialization activities. 
On behalf of the Ministry of Education, Chalmers established the so called Inno-
vation Office West, in 2011. This Office has a role as an innovation advisor to 
Chalmers as well as seven other regional HEIs. In 2011, the Innovation Office es-
tablished a support role for research-verification, where 37 validation projects 
were started which include analyzing the commercial potential of research results.  
 
Venture creation is another important process for Chalmers’ commercialization 
of new knowledge. Through the combination of the entrepreneurial school, incu-
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bators and seed investments, with an emphasis on active ownership, Chalmers has 
achieved great success with respect to this value creation process. In 2010, the 
portfolio companies in the Chalmers venture creation process had a turnover of 
over £ 43 million. 
 
By the creation of strong links between education and exploitation of 
knowledge, Chalmers School of Entrepreneurship has developed a unique venture 
creation model that has been recognized both nationally and internationally. The 
idea with this action-based school is to educate people, not about entrepreneur-
ship, but through entrepreneurship. Through this Chalmers contributes with entre-
preneurial graduates to the regional / national innovation system. In 2011, 
Chalmersinvest, Encubator Holding (linked to the School of Entrepreneurship) 
and Chalmers Innovation Seed Fund invested around £ 2 million in new ventures. 
 
In the Chalmers case the university has provided a list of the names and home 
addresses of every faculty employee as of spring 2012. Out of the identified 1191 
researchers we excluded visiting professors and others with a temporary employ-
ment, ending up with a list of 921 professors, docents, lecturers, and post docs. 
We used the database Retriever to identify all kinds of private company activities 
of these researchers. We found 276 persons with some kind of company engage-
ment. After excluding for example sole proprietorship and engagements as direc-
tor of the board in other kinds of organizations, we finally identified 207 incorpo-
rated firms created by Chalmers faculty. We used the Espacenet to do a patent 
search for all the identified university spin-offs as well as for the individual re-
searcher who had created the spin-off.  
 
To complement the data on spin-offs in the Chalmers case we also used the 
MONA database of Statistics Sweden to find university spin-offs created by facul-
ty who has left the employment at the university. This data consist of Swedish 
matched employer-employee panel data where we can find information on all new 
university spin-offs set up by researchers leaving the university between 1997 and 
2009. In doing so we found 62 firms created by former Chalmers employees. Un-
fortunately the use of this database didn’t allow us to identify the firms or the pa-
tents held.  
 
In addition, the use of the MONA database allowed us to compare Chalmers 
with other Swedish universities. Despite a high number of university spin-offs, we 
found that Chalmers was only ranked eighth of all Swedish universities in spin-off 
creation. Larger universities, like Lund University, created many more university 
spin-offs each year. Also, in Sweden, Chalmers is ranked tenth in size (number of 
full time researchers). Thus, we found that, in relation to size, the frequency of 




In this section we are presenting facts about the spin-off firms from each of the 
two universities. This includes data on the firm’s patenting and performance, and 
on the university affiliation of the academic directors.  
 
The university spin-off firms 
First, for the 75 spin-offs from Oxford University, we found that one company 
is a non-trading company and 9 companies are dissolved or in liquidation. Also, 
one company is registered in Belgium, hence there is no information registered in 
the UK Companies House. More than 50 companies have operated between 1-10 
years, 18 companies have been in operation between 11-15 years, while only 5 
companies have been in business longer than 16 years (Figure 2). 
 
Fig. 2: Number of Years in Operations – Oxford spin-offs.  
 
 
For Chalmers we identified a considerably higher number of university spin-
offs, a total of 207 incorporated firms created by researchers still employed at the 
university in spring 2012. Out of these eight are no longer active, and we lack data 
of founding year Thus, out of the 921 academic researchers employed at Chalmers 
in 2012, there were 129 researchers (14%) who had created an incorporated firm. 
This means that researchers active in company formation on average started 1.67 
14  
incorporated firms. The oldest four firms were established in the 1960s, and the 
average age of all 199 firms (where we know the founding year) was 11,26 years.  
 
Fig. 3 Number of years in operation: Chalmers spin-offs.  
 
 
In addition to analyze spin-offs set up by researchers employed at Chalmers 
University we also used the Swedish MONA database of Statistics Sweden to find 
out the total number of spin-offs created from Chalmers University. The MONA 
database consist of Swedish matched employer-employee panel data where we can 
find information on all new university spin-offs set up by researchers leaving the 
university. The database provides information on spin-offs created between 1997 
and 2009. In this period, there were a total of 164 new firms created by Chalmers 
researchers (excluding post-docs, PhDs and visiting researchers). Out of these we 
found 62 spin-offs where the researcher, in the first year after start-up, had gained 
a higher income from his/her own firm than from a university employment. These 
62 firms are then – most likely – direct university spin-offs where the researcher 
has left his/her university employment. Thus, these firms are in general not in-
cluded among the 207 firms identified among the researchers still employed at 
Chalmers. We can therefore conclude that Chalmers’s academic researchers gen-
erate far more spin-offs than is the case in Oxford. Moreover, that this is not a re-
cent phenomenon.  
 
Figures 4 and 5 show the sectors where the university spin-offs are established. 
Figure 4 shows the diversity of the Oxford companies; the largest group within the 
sampling firms is in pharmaceutical and biotechnological sector, followed by en-
gineering, software and chemistry sector respectively. The Chalmers spin-offs, 
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Figure 5, are dominated by engineering firms (out of which “research and consult-
ing” is the largest group). Medtech and biotechnology spin-offs are not very fre-
quent, something which is of course related to the fact that Chalmers is a technical 
university without any medical research. We do not find many “research and con-
sulting” spin-offs in the Oxford case. Probably such firms exist, but are not rec-
orded and owned by Isis Innovation. However, if we exclude the “research and 
consulting” spin-offs from Chalmers, we still find 105 university spin-offs from 
Chalmers. With respect to Oxford University’s research being three times the size 
of Chalmers, this is a very high figure.  
 
Fig. 4: Sector- Oxford spin-offs .  
 




We used a binary logistic regression to analyze the differences between Oxford 
and Chalmers spin-off formation, Table 2. First, the chi-square tests of the logistic 
regression model were significant for both groups of spin-offs and indicates that a 
significant relationship exists between the entire set of independent variables and 
the dependent variable (i.e. being an Oxford spin-off).  
 




Table 2 confirms that there are significant differences in spin-off formation at 
the two universities. The Oxford spin-offs are characterized by having more pa-
tents (p< 0.001), and being established in the biopharma (p< 0.000) or engineering 
sectors ((p< 0.02). Chalmers spin-offs are more often found in the research and 
consultancy sector (p< 0.001).  
 
Academic Characteristics and Patents Ownership 
There are 122 academics from the University of Oxford involved in spin-off 
companies: 114 are male and 8 female. The average age for male academics is 56 
years old, while 51 years old for female academics. Despite being a technical uni-
versity with relatively few female researchers, the share of women directors is 
higher in the Chalmers case. While only 6.6% of the academic directors in the Ox-
ford spin-offs were women, the corresponding figure in the Chalmers spin-offs is 
15%. Also in the Chalmers spin-offs the male founders are slightly older than the 
females; 53.7 years vs 52.2 years. In the Chalmers spin-offs the average age of the 
founder is 53.42 years. 
 
There are very large differences between the two cases when we compare the 
frequency of patenting in the spin-offs (Figures 6 and 8). Figure 6 shows that more 
than half of the academic directors from Oxford own 1-10 patents, while as many 
as 27 of them possess more than 11 patents. In addition, we discovered that 47% 
of the Oxford spin-offs’ patents were filed within the University IP system, 
whereas 53% of patents have filed outside the University IP system.    
 




Most of the academics in the Chalmers spin-offs do not own any patents (Fig-
ure 7). Together all the 199 spin-offs own 94 patents. Only 33 of the spin-offs 
have any patents at all. No firm holds ten patents or more. Moreover, it is not al-
ways the academic him/herself who is registered as the inventor. In fact, only 17 
of the 129 academic directors have invented patents owned by their own firms. 
Together these individuals have 39 patents.  
 




Since the Swedish law gives the IP rights to the individual academic researcher, 
there cannot be any bypassing within the Swedish system. But, as was found by 
Lissoni et al (2009) and Geuna and Rossi (2011), in the Swedish case academic 
patents are most often applied by existing firms. Elaborating a bit with the KEINS 
data4  for Chalmers we find that between 1980 and 2001 the database includes 102 
Chalmers-invented patents and 39 academic inventors. However, the assignees of 
the Chalmers patents are mainly (68.6%) large existing firms, over 50% of the pa-
tents are assigned to five large companies (Ericsson 22.6%, Kvaerner 8.8%, 
Pharmacia&UpJohn 7.8%, EKA 5.9%, Berol 5.9%). Only 21.6% are assigned to 
university spin-offs (15 start-up firms). Using the Espacenet to do a patent search 
for these 15 university spin-offs we found that they own 104 patents, (out of 
which 22 included in KEINS data). 36 of these were granted between 1980 and 
2001 and 68 between 2001 and 2011. This means that the average spin-off firm 
held 6.93 patents. Thus, in the Chalmers case, where the IP rests with the academ-
ic inventor, this leads to a high share of patents being assigned to large existing 
firms. Few of the university-spin-offs are patent-based, but there is a fraction of 
spin-offs that are assigned a relatively high number of patents.  
 
                                                          
4 The KEINS database on academic inventors contains detailed information on university profes-
sors from France, Italy, and Sweden, who appear as designated inventors on one or more patent 
application registered at the European Patent Office (EPO), 1978-2004. It was produced for the 
EU-sponsored project on Knowledge-based Entrepreneurship: Innovation, Networks and Sys-
tems, and is made available to all interested researchers through the CESPRI website. 
http://www.cespri.unibocconi.it 
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Size of the University spin-offs 
The size distribution of spin-off companies in the Oxford sample by employees 
and turnover is shown in Table 3. Taken together the 75 Oxford spin-offs employ 
almost 4 000 persons, and have a turnover of 430 million pounds. Thus, in the Ox-
ford case the 4600 academic and research staff has generated an additional 4000 
new jobs in the spin-offs (a ratio of 3959/4600=0.86).  
 
The majority of firms are however small (nearly three quarters). The exception 
being that there was one large company that did not go through Isis Innovation 
(1834 employees and a turnover of £ 337 million).  
 
Table 3 Number of employees and turnover in Oxford spin-offs, inside and outside the Isis 
Innovation system.  
 
a) One Oxford spin-off formed outside Isis system is a large outlier (1834 employees and 
a turnover of 337 300 k£). Excluding this firm reduces the total employment into 1614 employ-
ees (average 31.1 employees) and the turnover into 64 565 k£ (average 1 614 k£) 
 
The pattern for turnover is rather varied. On the whole, more of those which 
have bypass potential have a higher turnover, which might suggest an association 
between the ownership regime and performance. 
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Only very few of the Chalmers spin-offs are patent-based firms. To see if this 
affects the performance of the Chalmers spin-offs we choose to separate spin-offs 
with and without patents. Table 4 presents the number of employees and the turn-
over (in pounds) of the Chalmers spin-offs.  
 




Taken together the Chalmers spin-offs employ approximately 800 persons, and 
have a turnover of 97.6 million pounds. On the average each firm had 4.8 employ-
ees and a turnover of £623 k, figures considerably lower than for the Oxford spin-
offs. Also, the ratio between generated spin-off employment and academic and re-
search staff is lower in the Chalmers case (809/1600= 0,506). However, if the Ox-
ford outlier is excluded (a ratio of (3959-1834)/4600=0,27) the Chalmers ratio is 
in fact higher. 
 
T-tests of different measures of spin-off size and growth are presented in Table 
5. Here it is confirmed that the Oxford spin-offs are significantly larger and have 
demonstrated higher growth than the Chalmers spin-offs. Moreover, if the Oxford 
outlier is excluded from the analysis all measures of differences in size and growth 
are statistically significant at p< 0,05.  
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Also noteworthy (in Table 4) is that the spin-offs without patents outperform 
the 33 Chalmers spin-offs with patents. Moreover, checking figures of profitability 
among the Chalmers spin-offs show that the patent-based ones in fact generates a 
loss (on average a loss of £100 k in 2011) while the non-patent-based spin-offs in-
stead are more profitable (on average £27 k in 2011). Thus, the majority of the 
Chalmers spin-offs are small non-patent-based firms with a small profitability.  
 
Further we performed linear regressions of size and growth to better understand 
what can explain the performance of the spin-offs. Table 6 presents the results of 
the two regression models; Model 1 with the logarithmic value for turnover repre-
senting the Size of the firm, and Model 2 with the average annual growth in turno-
ver representing Growth. Model 2 has been separated into Model 2a and 2b. Mod-
el 2a includes the growth of all firms, while Model 2b excludes the one Oxford 
outlier with extreme high growth.  
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Table 6. Spin-off performance, regression log turnover and average growth.  
 
Significance level: * < .05,  and ** < .01., ***<.001and + <.10 
 
The regressions confirm that Oxford spin-offs outperform Chalmers spin-offs, 
and that this is the case even if the Oxford outlier is excluded from the analysis. 
Quite naturally, the age of the spin-off is important for the size, but not for the av-
erage growth of the firm. Also being in engineering has a positive effect on size 
and growth, while spin-offs in biopharma instead enjoy a limited growth and 
smaller size. Taken together this suggests that especially Oxford spin-offs in engi-
neering are likely to be high-performing firms. In addition, Table 6 also tells that a 
high number of patents have positive effect on average growth, but it should be 
noted that this effect disappears when the Oxford outlier is excluded. This firm not 
only holds a lot of patents, it is also demonstrating a considerable growth.  
 
University affiliation of academic directors 
Academics, who are involved in Oxford spin-off activities, are from 40 (out of 
70) Oxford departments and Colleges. More than half of the departments and Col-
leges in the sample only produced 1-2 spin-off companies. However, 16 spin-off 
companies are created from the Department of Engineering Science, followed by 7 
companies spun out from the Physical and Theoretical Chemistry Laboratory, and 
6 companies from Department of Chemistry, Department of Biochemistry and 
Magdalen College respectively.  
 
The consolidated picture of data for Oxford (e.g., number of patents, number of 
academics, number of patents filed within the University IP system, and number 
of patents with potential academic bypass) shows that academics from the depart-
ment of Engineering Science owned a high number of patents, in which the num-
ber of patents disclosed within the University IP system is slightly more than the 
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number of patents filed outside the formal IP system. Conversely, a different pat-
tern has been observed for academics from the department of Biochemistry. They 
are more prone to filing patents outside the IP system. This can possibly be ex-
plained by the potentially higher commercial value of the patents.      
 
In the Chalmers case the university does not own the IP, and thus, bypassing is 
not possible. Instead Figure 8 is used to illustrate the frequencies of both spin-offs 
and patenting from the 17 Chalmers departments.  
 




As can be seen in the figure the highest number of spin-offs and patents has 
originated from the department of Technology Management and Economics. At 
first this might seem odd, but is easily explained by the fact that researchers at this 
department are active in the Chalmers School of Entrepreneurship with its unique 
venture creation model. In addition, the departments of Chemical and Biological 
Engineering, Microtechnology and Nanoscience, and Signals and Systems, also 
generate a relatively high share of spin-offs and patents. The departments of Ar-
chitecture and Civil and Environmental Engineering also generate many spin-offs, 
even though these in general do not hold any patents.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusions  
In this chapter we asked how different institutional settings affect the commer-
cialization and exploitation of university research in Europe? By comparing two 
universities with well-established commercialization systems, we found that insti-
tutional settings matter in the rate and type of entrepreneurial activities (spin-off 
companies and patents). In relation to its size, the spin-off creation at Chalmers 
University is on par with other Swedish universities. Instead, Oxford University is 
an outlier among UK universities, only Cambridge University has created more 
spin-offs. Despite of this, our empirical data show that Chalmers University, with 
an inventor ownership model, generates a higher number of spin-off firms. At the 
University of Oxford, with a university ownership model, the frequency of univer-
sity spin-offs was found to be lower, but instead the firms performed better.  
 
Our findings are consistent with previous studies, which show that a significant 
percentage of academics do not engage in the entrepreneurial activities through 
formal IP channels. The idea of an entrepreneurial university rests on the idea that 
universities can and may act entrepreneurial themselves, for example by exploit-
ing and commercializing academic research. This is often done through the for-
mation of technology transfer offices with a specific task to commercialize univer-
sity IP, both through licensing knowledge and set up of university spin-offs. In 
this way, entrepreneurial universities are often assumed to contribute and encour-
age university entrepreneurship. In other institutional settings where universities 
themselves do not own the research results and IP, one of the basic conditions for 
an entrepreneurial university simply does not exist. Even so, as demonstrated in 
this chapter, this does not hinder university entrepreneurship. In fact, as found in 
the Chalmers case, university entrepreneurship can be very frequent even in cases 
where the rights to commercialize research results rest with the academic re-
searcher.  
 
Thus, the most important finding in this chapter is that universities can contrib-
ute to entrepreneurship and act entrepreneurial even when the IP rests with the 
university inventor, a function of decisions made within the prevailing system of 
government. Moreover, a considerable amount of university entrepreneurship does 
take place outside the formal IP system. This is not necessarily a problem that 
universities should try to stop - to encourage university entrepreneurship an entre-
preneurial university could also try to encourage the kind of entrepreneurship that 
is not necessarily based on university IP. 
 
Furthermore, our results indicate that even though there is a high frequency of 
university spin-offs in the Chalmers case, these are small and usually not based on 
patents. Compared to the Oxford case, the Chalmers spin-offs are considerably 
smaller, often acting as consultants. Interesting, the patent-based Chalmers spin-
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offs are not performing as well as the non-patent-based ones; they are both smaller 
and less profitable. Having spin-offs acting as consultants can of course be im-
portant when the spin-offs functions as research boutiques and transfer research 
results to other companies and organizations which use the IP to create growth and 
renewal. To further analyze such effects of technology transfer from university 
spin-offs is an important task for future research.  
 
One limitation in this study is that due to the lack of data on period(s) of em-
ployment with the University of Oxford, this study cannot conclude authoritative-
ly on the academic bypassing of Isis Innovation/University of Oxford for the dis-
closure or exploitation of their inventions. Even though the case provided in this 
study is drawn from a single institution and the data is rather descriptive, our find-
ings appear to be consistent with previous studies, which showed that a significant 
percentage of academics do not engage in the entrepreneurial activities through 
formal IP channels. In line with this further research on university spin-off bypass-
ing should be encouraged for a better understanding of European university entre-
preneurship outside of the formal IP system. The research on university spin-offs 
outside the IP system has been undertaken extensively in the U.S., while there, to 
the best of our knowledge, are yet no such studies carried out in European context. 
 
Our findings thus have some suggestions to the modus operandi of academic 
entrepreneurship. An attempt from policy makers or university administrators to 
highlight the importance of intellectual property rights towards academic entre-
preneurships seems to be focusing only on a fraction of academic entrepreneurial 
activities, whereas omitting some vital portions of them. In addition, the existing 
Oxford system that the entrepreneurial activities are expedited through Technolo-
gy Transfer Office falls short in supporting a substantial segment of academic en-
trepreneurial activities, which take place outside of the formal university IP sys-
tem. Otherwise, the aim and attempt of universities to employ academic 
entrepreneurship for the creation and contribution to regional economic develop-
ment might be undermined versus its prospect. 
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